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On the Limits and Possibilities 








Analyzing the consequences of a finite reservation price in Hotelling’s classic 
location model by using pure strategies in prices and lopations, we show that 
firms will never be further apart than half the length of the market and never 
closer together than one quarter if they cover the entire market (i,e. compete) 
at the symmetric equilibrium location.
We would like to thank, without implicating, Dan Kovenock, Stephen Martin, Louis 
Phlips, Jacques Thisse, Bauke Visser and workshop participants at the European Univer­























































































































































































In his influential article ’Stability in Competition’ Hotelling (1929) studies 
spatial duopolistic competition in a two-stage, non-cooperative game in which 
firms first choose locations and then are involved in Bertrand price competi­
tion. Hotelling argued that both firms will locate in the centre of the market, 
such that "buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness" 
(p.54). The celebrated ’Principle of Minimum Differentiation’ was bom. 
There was, however, a flaw in Hotelling’s reasoning, as pointed out indepen­
dently by Vickrey (1964) and d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979; 
henceforth AGT). The ’equilibrium’ price on which Hotelling’s argument was 
built is not a Nash-Coumot equilibrium price if firms are located too closely 
together, because then they have an incentive to undercut the opponent and 
capture the entire market. Once undercutting is profitable no pure strategy 
Nash-Coumot equilibrium in prices exists (see AGT).1
One crucial assumption of Hotelling, that each consumer purchases one 
unit irrespective of price, was already questioned by Lemer and Singer 
(1937). If taken literally the assumption of an infinite reservation price 
implies there is no upper limit to a consumer’s expenditure. Lemer and 
Singer argue: "It is necessary, therefore, to assume an upper limit to the price 
each consumer is willing to pay for his unit of commodity if we are going to 
be at all realistic."2 Economides (1984) analyzes some of the implications of
1 There is a remarkable, mystical footnote in Hotelling (1929, pp. 51-52) referring to 
the possibility of undercutting as "an adventitious feature of our problem" which is 
"necessary for simplicity," arguing that "in general we should consider q, and q2 as 
continuous functions of p, and p2." An adequate rebuttal to this loose claim of Hotelling is 
in d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1983), who show, under quite general circum­
stances, that if firms locate too closely together either i) profits go to zero, or ii) a Nash 
equilibrium in prices does not exist. Either possibility questions the Principle of Minimum 
Differentiation.
2 In discussing the assumptions of the Hotelling model Phlips and Thisse (1982) first 
mention a ’reservation price’ (p. 3). In Hotelling (1929) this reservation price is then 
infinite. One question this paper will answer is how high the reservation price should be in 
order to have no effect on the pure price strategies. Incidentally, Lemer and Singer do not 
study a two-stage game, but a game (that has no Nash-Coumot equilibrium) in which 



























































































a finite reservation price within the two-stage Hotelling model. His analysis is 
incomplete, however, since he restricts attention in the second stage game to 
locations for which some consumers at the comer of the market are not 
served. As a result firms either (i) want to relocate in the first stage of the 
game (moving away from each other), or (ii) are able to form local monop­
olies. The latter situation, in which the market is large enough for the two 
firms not to compete at all with each other and earn monopoly profits, is 
arguably the least interesting possibility.
We analyze the consequences for both price and location of introducing 
a finite reservation price in the two-stage Hotelling model. In addition to 
completing Economides’s (1984) analysis for symmetric locations we identify 
four more cases of interest in which firms actually compete with one another, 
one sub-case of which coincides with the Hotelling analysis of AGT. For the 
four new cases, we derive the limits and possibilities of the Principle of 
Minimum Differentiation as a function of the length of the market relative to 
the effective reservation price. In particular, we show that firms will never be 
further apart than half the length of the market and never closer together than 
one quarter.
2. THE MODEL
We analyze a two-stage game of complete information. In the first stage 
firms simultaneously choose location. At the second stage they compete in 
prices. The Nash-Coumot equilibrium in locations in the first stage of the 
game is based on the payoffs that are Nash-Coumot equilibrium payoffs of 
the second stage price game (subgame perfection).
Consumers are uniformly distributed along a line of length / (’main 
street or a transcontinental railroad’). There are two firms, a and b. Firm a is 
located ha units from the left end of the market and charges price pa. Similar­
ly, firm b is located hb units from the right end of the market and charges 
price pb. Transport costs are linear and equal to t for each unit of distance. 




























































































reservation price v beyond which all income is used for an outside good 
(Salop (1979)). Since consumers bear the cost of transportation (free-on-board 
mill pricing), a consumer located at point y of the market will not purchase 
the good if the delivered price of both firms exceeds the reservation price, i.e. 
if mm{pa+ t \ y - h a \,pb + t \ y  -hb \)>v. Otherwise, this consumer will pur­
chase from firm a if pa +t \ y - h a \>pb + t \ y - h b \, and from firm b if this 
inequality is reversed.
There are three parameters of interest in the above specification, 
namely v (the reservation price), t (the transportation cost), and / (the length 
of the market). A little inspection reveals that only the relative position 
between these variables is important. Therefore, we parameterize the model 
such that l = a v / t ,  and investigate what happens if a varies. The parameter 
a is thus the size of the market relative to the effective reservation price 
(v / t ), and can be interpreted as an indicator of the equilibrium intensity of 
rivalry (in a sense supplementary to the Lemer index or the price-cost 
margin). The theoretical rationale for this claim is threefold.
First, for given values of v and /, two monopolies arise if the cost of 
transportation t is high. Intuitively this is clear. If it is relatively costly for a 
consumer to switch from one supplier to another, a firm does not experience 
fierce competition. On the other hand, if transportation costs go to zero, all 
firms compete with each other on the basis of the price they quote (perfect 
competition).
Second, if the market is large, relative to v and f, there is room for two 
monopolies while for relatively small markets firms are in competition whith 
each other for the same consumers. To put it differently: if the market is 
large there is a wide dispersion in demand while consumers prefer similar 
products if the market shrinks.
Third, if the reservation price increases, relative to l and t, demand 
becomes more and more inelastic. In terms of profitability this market 
becomes more attractive to enter and rivalry will be more intensive. On the 
other hand, in case of low reservation prices only a few consumers are 




























































































More formally, we will investigate equilibria, such that ha,hbe[ 0 , l l2 ] . 
The strategy set of player i in the second stage is SI = {pj for
i=a,b.  Per unit production costs are constant and equal to zero without loss 
of generality. Therefore, the payoff function of player i in the second stage is
(1) *i(Pa’Pb’ha’hb)=PiDi(Pa’Pb’ha’hb)
where D, is player i’s contingent demand. For any pair (ha,hb) and any p. we 
denote by Pi(pJ,ha,hb) the set argmaxp n i(pa,pb',ha,hb) whenever it is 
non-empty (player i’s best reply correspondence). A Nash-Cournot Price 
Equilibrium of the second stage game is a pair of strategies (p l i h a,hb) ,pb (ha,hb)) 
such that p,’ (ha,hb) e P ^ p ’(ha,hb) ) , for i , j=a,b,  i* j .  (Bertrand or price 
competition). Let P"(ha,hb) be the set of price equilibria and let E be the 
subset of pairs (ha,hh) for which P ' ( h a,hb) is non-empty. For any pair 
(ha,hb) 6 E  define Tti(ha,hb) ^ n ii p ’(ha,hb) ,p^(ha,hb);ha,hb).3 4 Within 
this set we denote by H^hj)  the set argmaxh v;’(ha,hb) if non-empty. A 
Nash-Cournot Location Equilibrium of the first stage game is a pair (h ‘ , hb ) 
such that h*eHt(hj),  for i , j=a,b,  i*j .  This equilibrium is symmetric if 
h* = hb . Note that we confine our analysis to pure strategies.
The equilibrium concept builds on AGT (1983) and is similar to 
Friedman (1988), who reluctantly uses the term ’partial subgame perfection’ 
in this context. See section 8 below for a discussion.
For simplicity we restrict attention to local symmetric Nash-Cournot 
(henceforth N-C) location equilibria. In particular, given e> 0 , defmeB(/ij;e) 
as the closed e-ball around A,. Then, for all (ha,hb) e E  denote byHt(hy,e) 
the set argmaxh eB ĥ (ha,hb) . i A Local Symmetric N-C Location 
Equilibrium is a pair (h 'a ,hb ) for which 3 e> 0  such that h- eH ^h j i e ) , for 
i=a,b,  i* j .  Clearly the set of symmetric N-C location equilibria is a subset 
of the set of local symmetric N-C location equilibria. Since in all cases below
3 Implicitly we assume p ’ (•) to be uniquely defined (see also footnote 6).
4 Recall that h is defined in terms of distance to the left side of the market while A.a b




























































































in which the two firms actually compete with each other (a  <.2) there exists 
only one local symmetric N-C location equilibrium, our procedure identifies 
the unique symmetric N-C location equilibrium if it exists.5 If the market is 
large enough to sustain two monopolists ( a 2:2), our procedure identifies all 
symmetric N-C location equilibria.
Our methodology in the sequel is as follows. For all possible locations 
of firm a in the second stage price game, /ia e [0 ,/ /2 ] ,  we determine the 
price equilibrium, if it exists, in the neighbourhood of ha = hb. Substituting 
these prices in the payoff functions gives the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the 
second stage subgame n'l (ha,hb). We then determine the value ofdn- (ha,hb) /dhi, 
i ^ a , b ,  for ha=hb , taking appropriate left-hand or right-hand limits if 
needed. If the derivative is positive (negative) firms have an incentive to 
move closer to (away from) each other. A local symmetric N-C location 
equilibrium is reached if either (i) the derivative is zero, (ii) the left-hand 
limit is positive and the right-hand limit is negative, or (iii) the left-hand limit 
is positive and the right hand limit is not defined (because no N-C equilib­
rium price exists if firms move closer to each other).6
3. CASE 1; TWO MONOPOLIES: THE ECONOMIDES CASE ( o i 2 )
We start our analysis by investigating a large market. In fact, the market will 
be so large relative to the effective reservation price v/t ,  that the two firms 
will not compete with one another in the N-C location equilibrium and earn 
(maximum) monopoly profits.
For relatively small values of ha the firms are so far away from each 
other in the large market that they form local monopolies. If we define
5 Since we restrict the location strategy set of player a to be to the left of the centre of 
the market and that of player b to be to the right of the centre of the market, the symmet­
ric location equilibrium is unique. Enlarging the location strategy sets of both players to 
the entire market obviously leads to two symmetric location equilibria, where one is the 
mirror image of the other.
6 Note that these conditions also apply for player b since its location is measured from 




























































































Figure 1 Profits, Given Location, for a Monopolist
h
* (p )= (v -p ) /f  then, if firm a is a local monopolist located at point ha 
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Equation (4) shows that dn"a(ha,hb)/dha>0 for ha<v/2t,  implying that 
profits are maximized if the firm is at least v /21 away from the end of the 
market. The total length of the market covered by a firm is then v/r and the 
price charged equals v/2. Since there are two firms, both these firms can 
earn monopoly profits if, and only if, the market is large enough, i.e. iff 
/s2 v /r . This is equivalent to a ^2 , the case under investigation in this 
section.
The above discussion also shows that a conflict between the two firms 
arises if they get too close together and start encroaching on each other’s 
consumers. More precisely, if the distance between the two firms, d say, is 
smaller than v/r. If so, some consumers at the comers of the market are not 
served. This situation has been analyzed by Economides (1984). He shows 
that (i) if firms are fairly close to each other (6v /7 1<,d<v/1 there is a 
’touching’ equilibrium (with price = v - td /2 ) ,  (ii) if firms get closer 




























































































(with price = 0.4v + 0.2fd), and (iii) if firms get ’too close’ ( d < a ' v / t )  a 
N-C price equilibrium no longer exists.6 Economides also shows that under 
situations (i) and (ii) firms have an incentive to move away from each other 
in the first stage of the game, indicating that these situations are not N-C 
location equilibria.
Figure 2 illustrates our results for large markets in case a equals 3. It 
depicts firm a ’s N-C price equilibrium strategy p'a as a function of firm a ’s 
location ha (0<.ha<l/2)  for symmetric locations of the two firms (ha = hb), 
if it exists. Some illustrative delivered prices are also drawn. The picture of 
the market could be completed with regard to firm b's N-C price strategy by 
putting a mirror at the point 1/2. The continuum of symmetric N-C location 
equilibria are h ’ = /tfc* € [ v / 2 t , l / 2 - v / 2 t ] , with concomitant price v/2. Note 
that /ta* follows from the first ’definition’ of a local N-C location equilib­
rium. For Figure 2, where a equals 3, this translates to h'a = /t6" e[v /2 r,v /t] 
and pure strategy prices equilibrium defined up to ha=l/2 -a*v / t~  1.369v/t.
4. CASE 2; PROFIT MAXIMIZING CLUSTER POINT (4 /3 ^ a  <,2)
Suppose that the size of the market shrinks relative to the effective reserva­
tion price, i.e. a falls, in the analysis of section 3. This reflects either (i) a 
shrinkage of the length of the market /, (ii) a fall in transportation costs t, 
(iii) a rise in the reservation price v, or (iv) an appropriate combination of
(i)-(iii).7
An inspection of Figure 2 reveals that as a falls the range h ’ starts to 
shrink. Once a is smaller than 2 this range disappears, which might suggest 
that ha* disappears. Indeed, Economides (1984, p. 366) claims that:
6 As is well known, see AGT, the latter situation arises once it is profitable for a firm 
to undercut its opponent. The precise value of a* is determined by 1 /a '  =(7 +5v/T0)/6 
(see Economides (1984 p. 357) and appendix A). Moreover, for the ’touching’ equilibrium 
we follow Economides by selecting identical N-C equilibrium prices (see also appendix 
B).



























































































Figure 2 Two Monopolies: the Economides Case, a = 3e[2,°°)





























































































A Nash equilibrium of the varieties game exists if the reservation 
price is not-too-high.... The essential reason for this result is that, for 
relatively not-too-high reservation prices, firms are not guaranteed 
the purchases of the consumers who are located near the edges of 
the market.
This suggestion, that a N-C location equilibrium only exists if some con­
sumers in the comer of the market are not served, is not true. In what follows 
we show that /ta* is also defined when both firms together cover the entire 
market.
For small values of ha the optimal price strategy determined in Section 
3 in the absence of a competitor still holds, because firms still do not 
encroach on each other’s customers. As shown in Section 3 firms then have 
an incentive to move closer to each other.
For the case under investigation in this section (4/3 s a  s2 ) the first 
conflict between the two producers always arises if the distance between the 
firms is half the market (/z0 = Z/4), because the two firms together cover the 
entire market if haz l / 4 .8
If the distance between the two firms is small enough Economides’s 
analysis still holds such that there will be some consumers in the comers of 
the market who are not served and firms want to move away from each 
other.
In the intermediate range, if Economides’s analysis does not hold and 
ha is larger than //4 , the N-C equilibrium price equals v - t h a. This is 
discussed in more detail in the next section (see in particular footnote 10), 
which also shows that dn^(ha,hb)/dha<0 for the configuration of this 
section, i.e. firms have an incentive to move away from each other. As a 
consequence, the N-C location equilibrium occurs at the market quarters, 
/ia'= / /4 .  Note that /ta‘ follows from the second ’definition’ of a local N-C
8 If a <4/3  the two firms together can cover the entire market for ha<l/4. This 




























































































location equilibrium. The discussion is summarized in equation (5) with 
respect to N-C equilibrium prices, and is illustrated for a = 19/10 in Figure 
3. Note that for this value of a it becomes profitable to undercut if the 
distance between the two firms is smaller than a ' v / t  or if h* ^0.819v/f •
- ( v + ?  h ) ,  
2 0
0<.h c —  
“ 3?
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A few points are worth noting. First, when analyzing the ’undercutting’ 
condition that determines how close firms can get for a N-C equilibrium 
price to exist, Economides implicitly assumes that the undercutting firm can 
sell 2x(pu) if it charges undercutting price p u. However, if the size of the 
market is small enough this is not possible because then ha<x(pu). This 
limits the profitability of undercutting and affects the range over which pure 
strategy N-C equilibrium prices are defined (see equation (5)).9 Second, the 
competitive forces that drive firms apart, and the extent of the market forces 
that foster conglomeration, together result in an unique equilibrium location 
at the market quarters, h * - U 4, with concomitant price p '  =( ! - a /4 ) v .  This 
could be referred to as the ’Principle of Intermediate Differentiation’, which 
is efficient in minimizing transportation cost and maximizing the sum of 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus. Third, the range of locations over which 
Economides’s analysis is valid for a given value of a vanishes exactly at 
a =4/3. For the smaller market sizes (relative to the effective reservation 
price) considered in the sequel of this paper an ’Economides Range’ no 
longer exists.
5. CASE 3; GETTING CLOSE (8/7  ̂a ^4 /3)
If the size of the market falls slightly below that of the analysis of Section 4 
above, the first conflict of interest between the two firms arises when ha is in 
the first quarter (namely at ha- l - v / f ,  the point at which the two firms 
together just cover the entire market). From that point on up to ha = l /4 the 
N-C equilibrium price equals v - t ( l / 2 - h a), as illustrated in Figure 4. The 
analysis of this situation, which mimics the analysis of hae[ l /4J I2 )  below, 
is delegated to appendix B. In this appendix it is also shown that5 u * (ha,hb)/dha>0 
at ha - h b<l/4,  i.e. firms have an incentive to move closer to each other.




























































































Figure 4 Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Prices I




























































































Suppose that ha,hbe[ l / 4 , l / 2 ) . We want to show under which condi­
tions prices pa - v ~ t h a and p b- v - t h b are N-C equilibrium prices (in the 
neighbourhood of symmetric locations).10 This situation, which is crucial for 
an understanding of the influence of reservation prices on the N-C price and 
location equilibria in the Hotelling model, is illustrated in Figure 5. First 
note, however, that if  these are N-C equilibrium prices the resulting profits 
for firm a and b respectively are n “a{ha,hb) - { v - t h a)(l!2+ha- h b) and 
n*b(ha,hb) = ( v - t h b)( l /2+hb -h a). From these it is straightforward to derive 
that,dw*iha.hb)ldha - d i t l ( h a,hb)ldhb=0 if, and only if, h'a =hb = v /r- //2 . 
We will show that for the range of a under consideration in this section 
(8 /7  <; a <4/3) the local symmetric N-C equilibrium location is indeed at 
h ’ =v / t - l /2 .  Note that h ’ follows from the first ’definition’ of a local N-C 
location equilibrium.
We proceed by examining if a firm has an incentive to increase prices 
by charging price v - t h a+e, where £>0. Quoting this price leads m profits 
K*a~(v ~tha + e )[(ha- e l t )  + ( l - h a- h b) / 2 - e l t ] . .  Observe now that if price 
v - t h a is charged profits are na = ( v - t h a)(l /2 +ha ~hb). The condition 
n zO implies ha^v f t  -1/3 (*), for symmetric locations.11 Likewise, 
define ■na = (v - t ha~e)[(ha + e /2 t )  + ( l - h a~hb)/2] as the profits firm a 
would get if it were to lower its price by e>0 (but e ’small’, i.e. not large
enough to undercut once’s rival, see below). For symmetric locations the 
condition Tta -7 t~ i0  results in haz v / t - l  (**). Note that the conditional N-C 
equilibrium location derived in the preceding paragraph, /ia* = /th‘ = v /r- //2 , 
falls in the range spanned by (*) and (**). Two points remain to be resolved.
10 At these prices the profit curve is ’kinked’.
11 If a a l2 / 7  the two conditions h ^v /r-Z /3  and h ^ z l /4  cannot be fulfilled 
simultaneously such that for values of a larger than 12/7 the analysis here does not 
apply (see subcases 2.1 and 2.2 in the previous section). For smaller values of a (but 
larger than 4 /5 , see the analysis on undercutting below) the analysis does apply. The 
condition ha = v l t - l / 3  then indicates transition to the Economides analysis (see subcase 
2.3 in the previous section), or is irrelevant due to the profitability of undercutting (this 




























































































First, h"a must be larger than //4  for the analysis to hold, which translates 
into a ^4 /3 . Second, we have to examine the possibility of undercutting 
(which will translate into a 2 8/7).
To determine the range of locations for which a N-C equilibrium price, 
as depicted in Figure 5, is defined for a given value of a for symmetric 
locations ha^l j  4, we examine how close the firms can locate together before 
it is profitable to undercut the opponent. In the absence of undercutting, the 
N-C equilibrium price and resulting second stage profits equal pa ~ v - t h a, 
and na = ( v - t h a)l/2.  The undercutting price p u follows fromp u+2tha~ v - t h a 
, which results in profits n u= p j - ( v - t l  + tha)l,  because an undercutting firm 
always captures the entire market (see Figure 5). It follows that na = nu if 
/za = 2 //3  — v/3f. Therefore, N-C equilibrium prices are defined foxha<.2l/3 -v /3 f 
. As a consequence, the rule h ’ ^ v / t - l / 2  determines the local symmetric 
N-C equilibrium locations up to the point where it is profitable to undercut 
your opponent, i.e. up to v /r - I /2  = 2 //3 -v /3 r , which is equivalent to 
a =8/7. Furthermore, if the undercutting rule ha =2l/3 - v / 3 t  is equated with//4 
it follows that the situation depicted in Figure 5 holds for a 2:4/5 (see the 
next section).
The basic consequence of introducing a reservation price in the Hotel­
ling model is to lower the prices charged by the competing firms. Indeed, if 
the reservation price is infinite (or ’sufficiently high’, see Section 7 below) 
AGT show that the N-C equilibrium price for symmetric locations equals tl, 
if it exists. For the range of a under consideration in this section (8 /7  s a <.4/3 
) setting the price equal to f/ = av  results in a price which exceeds the 




























































































Figure 6 Nash-Cournot Location Beyond the Market Quarters,




duction of a reservation price substantially lowers the prices charged in the 
market, which makes it much less attractive to undercut the rival.12 
Consequently, N-C equilibrium prices are defined beyond the quarters. In an, 
ultimately vain, effort to capture market share firms have an incentive to 
move closer together, which strengthens the competition between the two 
firms and lowers prices. The limit of the Principle of Minimum Differen-
j
12 In fact, at the N-C equilibrium location of this section the N-C equilibrium price = 




























































































tiation is reached when a =8/7, which results in /ia*=3//8 and a minimum 
location equilibrium distance between the two firms of 1/4 (= 5 //8 -3Z /8 ). 
For smaller values of a the threat of price wars from undercutting will push 
the firms back to the quarters, as the next two sections will show. On the 
other hand, for all values of a exceeding 8/7 the local symmetric N-C 
location equilibrium is determined by profit maximization considerations, not 
by the threat of price wars.
The N-C equilibrium price for given locations is given in equation 6. 
The ’getting close’ case is illustrated for a equal to 7/6  in Figure 6, which 
implies l - v t - v / 6 t  and 2 //3 -v /3 f= 4 v /9 t.
(6)
— (v + th ), 0 <.h <.1--
2 a a t
Pa ~ v + t(h -  — l - - z h  s  — y a a 2 ' ’ f a 4
I , 21 vv- th„,  ---------
fl 4 a 3 31
6. CASE 4; LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE THREAT OF WAR (4/5 <; a ^8/7
The analysis in this section can be very brief because it is almost identical to 
that of the previous section. Two important points should be noted. First, if 
a is smaller than 1 the two firms always compete with one another and 
cover the entire market, even if dispersion is at its maximum {ha = hb-0).  
Consequently, for such values of a (small markets, or large effective 




























































































of a smaller than 8/7 we have dn^(lia,hb)/dha>0 at ha = hb over the entire 
range of locations for which N-C equilibrium prices are defined. Therefore, 
the local symmetric N-C location equilibrium is at this edge’, i.e. determined 
by the undercutting rule. The equilibrium location, h ' , thus follows from the 
third ’definition’ of a local N-C location equilibrium. The threat of an 
undercutting price war keeps firms from moving closer together. For the 
range under consideration in this section (a  e [4 /5 ,8 /7 ])  this translates into 
/ia* = 2 //3 -v /3 r  = 1/3 [2 - 1 / a ]/, with concomitant price p  * =2(2 - a)  v /3 . 
For completeness, the N-C equilibrium price for arbitrary symmetric locations 
is given in equation 7.
(7)
v + t ( h - ~ ) ,  l - - < . h < -  
“ 2 t a 4
Pa
l . 21 v-  u/i s ----- ---
4 3 3f
+ 0<.haz l - - '
4 .— £ a ^ 1
5
p  = v + t(h -  —), l - - z h
“ 2 t a 4
1 8
7
v~tha, l , 21 v-<.hnz — - — 
4 ‘ 3 3l
7. CASE 5; MAKING A STAND: HOTELLING (Os;a ^4 /5 )
The analysis in this section can be as brief as that of the previous section. 
First, note that for a e [2 /3 ,4 /5 ]  the symmetric location ha=3l/2 vjt,  
derived in appendix B, marks the transition of the N-C equilibrium price 




























































































Figure 7 Hotelling: Living on the Edge, a =3/5e[0 ,2 /3]
N-C equilibrium price strategy pa=tl for hQz 3 l / 2 - v j t  derived by Hotelling. 
AGT show that the Hotelling price strategy is defined up to the market 
quarters, such that the local symmetric N-C location equilibrium occurs at the 
quarters, with concomitant N-C equilibrium price tl. Second, note that for 
values of a below 2/3 the range of locations with the N-C equilibrium price 
strategy depicted in Figure 4 disappears. Thus, the Hotelling analysis as 
derived by AGT holds for a ’sufficiently high’ reservation price. More 
precisely, a reservation price v that drives a =f//v below 2/3,  for given 
values of the length of the market Z and transportation costs t. This case is the 
’pure’ Hotelling model and is illustrated in Figure 7. Equation 8 gives the 




























































































v - t ( - - h a). 0 <,ha < 31 v
Z,
— z a < — 
3 5
(8) t l ,
8. DISCUSSION
Our analysis can be neatly summarized for all possible values of a , i.e. for 
all possible market sizes relative to the effective reservation price, by giving 
the local symmetric N-C equilibrium location (see equation (9) and Figure 8) 
and concomitant N-C equilibrium price (see equation (10) and Figure 9) as a 
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, ,  a  .(1 —  )v, 4 0— £  a £ 2
4 3
1— v, 2 £  a  <  <*>
2
Our discussion in this section restricts attention to those situations in 
which the two firms actually compete with one another and cover the entire 
market (a £.2). The limits and possibilities of Hotelling’s Principle of 
Minimum Differentiation for equilibrium locations are immediately clear 
from Figure 8: firms will never move closer together than a quarter of the 
length / of the market (= 5 /8 -3 /8 ) ,  and never further apart than half the 
length of the market (=3/4  -1 /4).  In most cases the firms are located at the 
market quarters, and it would therefore be more appropriate to refer to the 
Principle of Intermediate Differentiation in the Hotelling setting.13 Firms 
have a tendency to move closer together to serve a larger market, but tend to 
retreat because of fiercer competition, or the threat of price wars.
The equilibrium price (see Figure 9) basically varies between one half 
and four-fifth of the reservation price. The fact that for a approaching zero 
the price depicted in Figure 9 also approaches zero is deceiving because for 
a s 4/5 the equilibrium price equals tl (see case 5), and is independent of
13 As noted before, AGT (1979 and 1983) already showed that the Principle of 
Minimum Differentiation is in general not valid. In quite different settings the Principle of 
Minimum Differentiation may hold, see e.g. De Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and 
Thisse (1985), and Friedman and Thisse (1993). For quadratic transportation costs AGT 
(1979) derive a Principle of Maximum Differentiation, which however does not hold for 




























































































Figure 8 Equilibrium Locations




























































































the reservation price (as long as the reservation price exceeds a threshold 
level).
Our analysis appears to be modest in two respects because we restrict 
attention to pure strategies and investigate only local symmetric equilibrium. 
Nonetheless, as argued below and in Section 2, we believe our analysis ident­
ifies an important location equilibrium.
The restriction of attention to pure strategies, building on AGT (1983), 
Economides (1984) and Friedman (1988), is partly based on ease of analysis 
and partly on a dislike of mixed strategies. As Martin (1993, p.274) puts it:
Real-world decisions about the locations of plants are not made 
randomly. Models that possess pure-strategy equilibria are more 
likely to yield a priori plausible hypotheses than models with mixed 
strategy equilibria.
Allowing for mixed strategies in the second stage of the game implies there 
is a N-C price equilibrium for all possible locations (Dasgupta and Maskin 
(1986)). This may have implications for the location equilibrium, as Friedman 
(1988, p. 616) points out (read "location" in stead of "output level"):
I see no way to rule out the possibility that the equilibrium ... will 
be destroyed if mixed strategies are allowed. Perhaps a firm might 
increase its expected payoff by switching to an output level whose 
second-stage best play is a mixed-price choice. Analyzing this 
question appears extremely formidable.
Testimony of the fact that the analysis of ’this question’ can indeed be 
’extremely formidable’ is given by the path-braking article of Osborne and 
Pitchik (1987) in a much simpler setting than Friedman (1988). Osborne and 
Pitchik analyze pure strategy in location in the first stage combined with 




























































































(i.e. case 5 with a <.2/3).u They find an unique N-C location equilibrium. 
The fact that this unique location equilibrium is symmetric to some extent 
justifies our decision to investigate only (neighbourhoods of) symmetric 
location equilibria. Using simulations Osborne and Pitchik estimate the N-C 
location equilibrium, when allowing for mixed price strategies, to be at 
h'"  =0.27/. Comparing this mixed price strategy location equilibrium with 
our pure price strategy location equilibrium h ' =0.251 (see case 5), suggest
that firms have little, if any, incentive to enter the region in which pure
strategies no longer exist.
First, the small difference between h ’ and h ‘" suggests that if firms 
have an incentive to enter the mixed strategy price region, this incentive is 
small and quickly evaporates as firms move closer together. Second, Osborne 
and Pitchik show that, for symmetric locations, firms never charge a price 
exceeding the Hotelling price when allowing for mixed price strategies (tl  = 1 
in their paper). This suggests that the prices one can derive here if no pure 
price strategy exists by ignoring the possibility of undercutting, are upper 
bounds for the mixed price strategies as well. If so, the equilibrium locations 
we identify here for values of a exceeding 8/7 (cases 1, 2 and 3), which are 
determined by profit maximization considerations, will most likely be robust 
with respect to allowing for mixed strategies in prices.
Finally, we want to draw attention to the similarity between the 
Principle of Intermediate Differentiation for a line segment and the equilib­
rium location in a circular market. Indeed, Kats (1995) shows that for a 
circular market with a ’high enough’ reservation price (i.e. firms compete and 
cover the entire market), the equilibrium location is equidistant spreading 14




























































































along the circle with corresponding equilibrium price in pure strategies. On 
the other hand, the Principle of Intermediate Differentiation does not always 
hold for a linear market (cases 3 and 4). The difference in outcome arises 
because the geometry' of the line enables a firm to have a protected ’hinter­
land’, which gives an incentive to move closer to its opponent, while the 
geometry of a circle does not allow for this movement.15 If this hinterland is 
very profitable the possibility to undercut your opponent restores equidistant 
spacing (the hinterland then effectively disappears).
9. CONCLUSIONS
We analyze the effect of introducing a reservation price in the classic 
Hotelling (1929) model, in which firms first choose location and then are 
involved in Bertrand price competition. We restrict attention to pure strategies 
and neighbourhoods of symmetric locations. We complete the analysis of 
Economides (1984) for two monopolists and distinguish four more possibil­
ities in which firms compete with one another. The equilibrium location of 
one of those four possibilities coincides with the Hotelling case analyzed by 
AGT (1979). Since the equilibrium location is usually at the market quarters 
(which maximizes the sum of consumer and producer surplus), it is more 
appropriate to speak of a Principle of Intermediate Differentiation than of a 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation. If firms compete at the equilibrium
15 For the same reason Kats’ argument on p. 4 on the limited profitability of undercut­




























































































location (and thus cover the entire market) we show' that firms will never be 
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In this appendix we derive the minimum distance between producers such 
that a pure strategy Nash-Coumot equilibrium in prices exists if some 
consumers at both comers of the market are not served.
Al. LARGE MARKETS
Let d<.6v/7t be the distance between the producers and parameterize this 
distance such that d = y v /t.  In the absence of undercutting the price charged, 
p,  and the quantity sold, q, are given by (see Economides (1984)):
p -  — (2v + r d ) - 2 ± I v .
5 5
d  , v - p  _ 3(2 + y) v
q 2 t 10 r '
Hence, profits n equal:
3(2 + y )2 v2 
50
n=pq
If a firm wants to undercut his opponent the price charged, p u, and quantity 
sold, qu, are:
PU=P t d - W - ^ K ,
<lu




























































































Hence, profits from undercutting, ita, are:
4(1 - 2 y ) ( 3 + 4 y )  v2 
25 t
The minimum distance between the two firms, a *v/r, follows from equating 
■n and n u and solving for y . Call this solution a ' ,  we get:
If firms are located such that y<a* ,  it becomes profitable for a firm to 
undercut his rival, i.e. no pure strategy Nash-Coumot equilibrium in prices 
exists.
Economides (1984) also derives a condition under which a ’competi­
tive’ N-C equilibrium exists. In particular it must be that (p.357, formula (8)):
This must be the same as our condition for a ’competitive’ equilibrium (see 
case 1):
Realizing that y - x  is the distance between the two firms (d in our notation), 
that k is Economides’ reservation price, and that Economides sets unit 
transport costs at one (f = 1 ), it must be that
lOy/TÔ ~ 14 = a ' =0.263.
7+5/IÔ
6





























































































_L = 67 = 67 = 70vl0 /6 + 8 3 V 3-70 /r0 /6 - l(
a '  lO/lO -14 6 (1 0 /1 0 /6 -7 /3 )  6 (1 0 /1 6 /6 -7 /3 )
= (10/16/6  -7 /3 ) (5 / lO  +7) = 5 /16+7  
6 (1 0 /1 0 /6 -7 /3 )  6
A2. SOMEWHAT SMALLER MARKETS
A slight complication in the derivation of the minimum distance between 
firms arises if the market becomes ’somewhat’ smaller. The problem occurs 
because the discussion in Appendix A1 assumes that a firm can sell quantity 
qu if it charges price p u when it undercuts its opponent. However, if h < q j2, 
this is not possible (see Figure Al). Therefore, consider now a symmetric 
location h such that when undercutting qJ2> h , given that both firms charge 
’competitive’ prices in the Economides (1984) sense.
Let / = av/ f .  The objective is to find a scalar p , implicitly given by 
/i = Pv/f, such that profits from undercutting are equal to regular profits. In 
the absence of undercutting, price p, quantity q and profits n equal:
P = i [v+ ' ( l ~ /l)] = J [(2 + a ) ~2 p i v ’
9 = [ ( | - f c )  +
v - p , f 6 + 3a
~~T “ 10
n = ^ [ ( 2  + a ) - 2 p j [  “ 3 P] .
If a firm undercuts his rival, he charges price p u, sells quantity qu, and earns 




























































































Figure Al Undercutting in a ’somewhat smaller’ market
pB= p - 2 t ( | - A )  = | [ ( l - 2 o ) +4 p ] v >
9“4 +zf +(rH [(3+4B)-3p]7 ’





























































































Setting 7t = n u and solving for p as a function of a gives us:
n , . 3 +5a -sia.1 + 18a +9
o
'fhe situation of a ’somewhat’ smaller market occurs \ih < (v -p u \ a=a-)/t 
or ( a v / t - d \ a , a.)i'2 < (v-p u \a, a~)/t- This leads to:
a <(6 +13 o*)/5 = 1.884.
Note that for a = ( 6  + 13a*)/5 it follows that q J 2 - h  for h = l/2 -a 'v /2 t ,  
i.e. the analyses of Appendix A1 and A2 coincide.
APPENDIX B
This appendix derives the N-C equilibrium prices depicted in Figure 4 in the 
text. Clearly, this is the analog of the ’touching’ equilibrium analyzed by 
Economides (1984) when consumers in the comer of the market are served 
rather than not served. For the range of locations that gives rise to this type 
of ’touching’ equilibrium a continuum of N-C equilibrium prices exists as a 
result of the kinked profit function. We will therefore follow Economides, 
who appeals to symmetry and Harsanyi’s (1975) ’tracing procedure’, by 
selecting equal N-C equilibrium prices for both firms. Let ha,hbe [ 0 ,l l4 ] . 
We want to show under which conditions p ’ =pb = v - t ( l - h a-h b)l2  in the 
neighbourhood of symmetric equilibria. First, note that if these are the N-C 
equilibrium prices n'a(ha,hb) = ( v - t ( l - h a -h b)l2 )(h a + (l-h a-h b)l2 )  are 
the resulting profits for firm a, while for firm b these are in that case given 
by n l(h a,hb) = ( v - t ( l - h a-h b)l2 )(h b + ( l - h a -h b)l2 ) . Consequent ly,
dn"a(ha,hb)/dha>0 and dv.'b(ha,hb)l dhb>Q, indicating that firms have an 
incentive to move closer together. Second, note that it is not possible to 
undercut your opponent as this requires a negative price. Third, a price 
increase reduces profits for ha = hb if haz l - v / t .  This condition is operative 
in case 3 and subcase 4.1 in the text. Fourth, a price cut reduces profits for 
ha -h b if haz 3 l /2 - v / t .  This condition marks transition to the Hotelling 
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